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Professional Asset Managers and the Evolution of Corporate Governance in France 
and Japan: Lessons from a Questionnaire Survey1 
Yumiko Miwa (Meiji University), Peter Wirtz (Univ. Lyon, Jean Moulin University), 
Mitsuru Mizuno (Nihon University), Mohamed Khenissi (Chambéry University) 
 
Abstract 
A corporate governance system consists of a set of mechanisms which restrict managerial 
discretion. The constraints on managerial discretion in the Anglo-Saxon environment, 
considered as a benchmark, are usually described as being primarily driven by 
shareholder interests, whereas the French and Japanese systems are traditionally thought 
of as more stakeholder oriented. However, the increasing share of international ownership 
has had a significant impact on corporate governance in both countries over the last two 
decades. The shareholder-driven discourse on corporate governance best practice, which 
leans heavily on agency theory, has been progressively institutionalized on a global scale 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Institutional investors and professional asset 
management firms are likely to have been powerful advocates of institutionalizing 
discourse on corporate governance best practice (Wirtz, 2008a). We conducted a survey 
in order to study asset management firms’ underlying perceptions and motivations in 
actively influencing corporate governance in France and Japan. Specifically, we set out 
to know to what extent professional asset managers endorse standard discourse on 
corporate governance best practice and feel they exert an active influence on corporate 
governance in France and Japan. In this paper, we present the major results of the survey. 
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Science (JSPS), under contract # 23330131. They are also indebted to Valentine Bonnet, Carlos Pardo and 
Thomas Valli from AFG for the support and helpful comments and feedback in conducting the French 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has come to be seen as an important challenge for the financial 
community since the 1990s. The movement of corporate governance best practice was 
initially set off in Anglo-Saxon countries, and reached France and Japan in the middle of 
the 90s (Wirtz, 2008a). Most OECD countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) had opened their capital accounts and largely deregulated finance, and 
the flood of equity capital was becoming visible across the globe. Equity flows are 
primarily driven by US and UK pension funds and other institutional investors. The flows 
are the largest in France and Germany. Cross-border transactions in bonds and equities, 
as a percentage of GDP, reached over 500% in France and 100% in Japan in 2003. 
(Tiberghien, 2007). Historically, Japan and France both had an ‘indirect’ finance system 
in which banks played central roles. However, as the capital flows increased, capital 
markets became more important than before for the corporate governance system. 
A corporate governance system consists of a set of mechanisms which restrict managerial 
discretion, such as direct shareholder control, independent boards, etc. The constraints on 
managerial discretion in the Anglo-Saxon environment are traditionally described as 
being primarily driven by shareholder interests, whereas the French and Japanese systems 
are thought of as more stakeholder oriented (Guillén, 2000). The increasing share of 
international ownership has had a significant impact on corporate governance in both 
countries, albeit at a different pace. Major reforms of corporate governance had been 
carried out by 2002 in France. In Japan, the stewardship code for institutional investors 
was set off in February 2014, and the corporate governance code was introduced as 
recently as 2015.  
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The ownership share of foreign investors in Japanese firms rose from 7.7% in 1993 to 
33% in 2015. This drastic change has had a significant impact on corporate governance 
reform recently. Japanese firms have responded to the demands of institutional investors 
by adopting a system that includes, for example, non-statutory executive officers and 
independent statutory auditors. Some firms have also adopted committee-based board 
system structures modelled on US boards. Although Japan’s corporate governance system 
has changed since the early 2000s, it has been criticized by foreign investors because it 
has yet to meet ‘global standards’ (ACGA, 2009). Prime Minister Abe’s policy on 
corporate governance is an attempt to meet the request of foreign investors. The corporate 
governance code of 2015 requests Japanese firms to meet more frequently, and to engage 
in active dialogue with institutional investors. 
The increasing influence of institutional investors has transformed corporate governance 
systems worldwide. More concretely, in the case of listed companies, asset management 
firms which manage assets of their institutional investor clients have come to play an 
increasing role in the diffusion of ‘global’ corporate governance standards. They have 
progressively established themselves as a counter power (Pardo & Valli, 2012) and, thus, 
as a significant actor in the field of corporate governance. In the case of France, Pardo 
and Valli show that this active approach to governance has not only manifested itself in 
asset managers’ voting policy and dialogue with corporate management, but also has 
steadily increased over time. Asset management firms’ role in the evolution of corporate 
governance hence appears to be time-contingent. 
While corporate governance systems in France and Japan share certain similarities in 
terms of an institutional distance from the Anglo-Saxon benchmark, there are few studies 
which actually make a comparative assessment of asset managers’ influence on the 
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contemporaneous dynamics of governance in both countries. For methodological reasons, 
we focused on these two countries, France and Japan, which both originally had strongly 
bank-based finance systems and weak stock markets. We thus hoped to capture the 
similarities and differences of the perceived role of asset managers in the respective paths 
of institutional evolution of the national corporate governance systems.  
We conducted the survey in order to study asset management firms’ underlying 
motivations and perceived role in actively influencing corporate governance in France 
and Japan. Specifically, we set out to find to what extent professional asset managers both 
endorse standard discourse on corporate governance best practice, and feel they exert an 
active influence on corporate governance in France and Japan. In this paper, we present 
the major results of the survey. Overall, our results indicate that, in both countries, asset 
management firms support the discourse on global standards of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Differences exist in the perception of their actual influence on practice over 
recent years. This influence appears to have been relatively stronger in France than in 
Japan. Although discourse on global standards is strongly endorsed by asset managers in 
Japan and in France, the mechanism that is perceived to be most effective in promoting 
this discourse is direct dialogue with corporate management, rather than confrontational 
shareholder activism, which distinguishes the two countries of our study from the Anglo-
Saxon benchmark. This difference has practical implications for international asset 
managers seeking to influence corporate governance practice in Japan and France. These 
implications concern the way effective reform can be achieved in different institutional 
contexts (dialogue versus confrontation) and the possible pace of change. Promoters of 
change should be aware of the path dependence of institutional change. 
. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the historical 
roots of Japanese and French corporate governance; Section 3 describes the Corporate 
Governance Reform and the influence of institutional investors and asset managers on 
Corporate Governance in both countries in recent years; Section 4 explains the 
methodology of our survey; Section 5 presents the results of the survey on corporate 
governance by asset management firms in Japan and France. We will discuss the original 
results from our survey in both countries before concluding in Section 6. 
      
2. Historical roots of corporate governance in Japan and France  
Japan 
In this study, our attention with respect to corporate governance is focused on large 
publicly-listed companies. Governance concerns the following issues: i) for whose 
benefit should a company be operated?; and ii) how should operations be controlled? 
Specifically, we discuss the following elements: i) should a company be operated for the 
benefit of the shareholders (stakeholders), or interested parties in general (the objectives 
of the enterprise)?; and ii) methods of assuring quality and improving management, which 
involve the structure of external regulation and autonomy within the company, the design 
and utilization of organizational mechanisms by managers and directors, and the extent 
of checks on managers (Oosugi, 2013; Egashira, 1994). 
In Japan, there is a tendency to understand enterprises as ‘communities’ made up of 
managers and (full-time) employees. Team members have fixed relationships due to a 
system of lifetime employment, and therefore the relationship between members becomes 
a repeated game, stimulating cooperation (Arai, 1997). This aspect can be seen as an 
advantage of the Japanese management style. It is indicated, however, that due to the 
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existence of the lifetime-employment system, an enterprise indeed does have the aspect 
of being a community in which many people spend their lives; there is, therefore, a 
tendency to place importance on consensus, and a weakness in making decisions 
necessary for earning profits (Numagami, 2003).  
While there are differences in degree, it is believed that Japanese firms in general: i) tend 
to prioritize actors such as employees over shareholders; and ii) have strongly cautious 
views about involving officials (both executives and auditors) from outside the company, 
and about granting authority to outside directors. 
Firms in Japan may be part of large corporate groupings or keiretsu. The member firms 
of industrial keiretsu have large ownership stakes by dominant or affiliated companies, 
and complex cross-shareholding arrangements which may include main banks as block 
shareholders. In keiretsu, firms transact with each other and sometimes board members 
originate from an affiliated company. Also the main bank plays a significant role in 
governance: it acts as a monitor of member firms’ activities and holds equity in those 
firms, as well as providing loans to them (Buchanan and Deakin, 2007). 
Historical and cultural context may be considered as influential with regard to such 
tendencies of Japanese firms (and the Japanese society). The likely factors that shaped 
the culture of a) understanding a company as a ‘company community’ involving 
managers and key employees, and that of b) making efforts to keep the intervention of 
external actors to a minimum, are i) the separation of authority and influence (going back 
to the Fujiwara clan’s regent-led politics (sekkanseiji) (The Fujiwara clan was a family 
which gained political power in Japan by placing its members as regents to young 
emperors from the late 8th to 9th Century. While the authority officially rested with the 
imperial family, the influence was in the hands of the Fujiwara); ii) benevolent 
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governance (tokuchi) and civil administration (bunji) , and the idea that a man of power 
should be checked by himself, not by the people (the Edo shogunate); iii) the system of 
lifetime employment characterized by lump sum recruitment of new graduates and low 
labor mobility (following various wartime and postwar reforms); and iv) the 
decentralization, grouping, and increased interdependence of shareholding, and provision 
of funding by a main bank (a product of wartime and postwar reforms). This Japanese 
culture and tradition contains a mixture of elements over 1000 years old, and elements as 
young as several decades (Oosugi, 2013). 
In particular, reflecting on the past about incidents pertaining to points iii) and iv) reveals 
that, until around 1935, labor-management relations in large Japanese enterprises were 
laissez-faire in principle and the rate at which laborers would leave their jobs (transferring 
between enterprises) was high (Odaka,1993). Furthermore, the demands of shareholders 
toward managers were short-sighted (Okazaki, 1995; Aoki & Dore, 1991). During the 
late Meiji era, many ‘executives’ in large enterprises were not employed full-time, and 
they would either be eminent figures from various fields or people connected to large 
shareholders; their presence was similar to outside directors of today. After the Russian-
Japanese War in 1904, it became common for people to be managers, having been 
recognized for expert ability and promoted within the company (specialist managers) 
(Abe & Miyamoto,1995). However, under the present scenario, as far as factors iii) and 
iv) mentioned in the earlier paragraph are concerned, the financial system centered on a 
main bank has already to a considerable extent become a thing of the past. Signs of change 
in recent years can be seen in other factors as well. 
It may therefore be said that the establishment of the ‘company community’ is a post-
World War II phenomenon; and the tendency to secure the autonomy of insiders and deny 
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the entry of outsiders is a culture that extends back no further than several decades 
(Oosugi, 2005). Several decades, however, are, in their own respect, a lengthy period, and 
may have a strong bearing on Japan’s recent path of institutional evolution. 
 
France 
Traditionally, the French attitude towards business distinguishes itself from a monistic 
(purely shareholder oriented) representation of the firm. In fact, in 1995, Marc Viénot, a 
former CEO of one of France’s most important banks, published a report on corporate 
governance which benefited from widespread attention in the French business community. 
It stipulated the ‘obligation’ of the board of directors ‘to act in all circumstances in the 
social interest of the firm’ (Viénot, 1995 [our translation]). The report then goes on to 
explicitly distinguish this perspective from an approach purely guided by the 
maximization of shareholder value (Viénot, 1995). According to Peyrelevade (1998), a 
long-time CEO of formerly state-owned Crédit Lyonnais, the concept of the firm which 
underlies the Viénot report reflects the opinion of the majority of managers in France. 
Traditionally, in French public opinion, ‘profit has a bad smell’ (Lesourne, 1998: 103). 
As a consequence, in spite of claiming the maximization of profits for shareholders, the 
dominant ideology favors ‘the prosperity and the continuity of the firm’ (Peyrelevade, 
1998: 39). The preceding paragraph indicates that the traditional French ‘philosophy’ of 
the firm takes into account the interests of multiple stakeholders. But how are stakeholder 
interests protected? In fact, French tradition designates the State as the best-suited actor 
in order to assure the alignment of all economic decisions with the previously described 
philosophy of stakeholder orientation. According to Albert (1991), France has cultivated 
‘social colbertism’ for a long time. Albert summarizes this doctrine, referring to Colbert, 
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a very influential minister under France’s absolutistic monarch Louis XIV, as follows: 
‘the State [...] commands the economy in the name of a political ambition and of a striving 
for social progress’ (Albert, 1991:266 [our translation]). From this perspective, the State’s 
role is perceived as one of a referee between the demands of different stakeholders. It 
‘acts in place of the economic and social actors’ (Les Echos, 1998 [our translation]). In 
doing so, the State is considered to be a ‘protector who assures redistribution according 
to the republican principle of égalité’ (Les Echos, 1998 [our translation]). It is important 
to emphasize that the control instruments of quite different corporate governance systems 
are theoretically consistent with a pluralist approach of the firm. Why, then, does the 
French tradition assign such a central role to the State in spite of privileging the 
mechanisms of direct negotiation between different stakeholder categories? One factor 
which is likely to contribute to an answer is the existence of very polarized interests in 
France. In fact, French trade unions are traditionally characterized by a ‘class-fight 
ideology’ (Albert, 1991[our translation]). Hence, there is a tendency towards adopting 
extreme opposite positions. This may partially explain the polarization of the interests of 
different stakeholder types. According to Peyrelevade (1998), the notion of compromise 
often has a negative connotation. Knowing this, it is easily understood why the State plays 
the role of a referee. In fact, since direct compromise between certain stakeholder groups 
is problematic, the structuring of mutual relations necessitates the aid of a ‘superior’ entity. 
The latter’s position happens to be occupied by the State. France’s traditional concept of 
the firm is thus historically based on a ‘profoundly anti-liberal instinct of a large part of 
the French opinion’ (Les Echos, 1998 [our translation]). This opinion does not take into 
consideration a company as tradable merchandise among others (Albert, 1991). 
Traditionally, free market mechanisms are regarded rather suspiciously, and there is a 
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belief in the benefits resulting from the State’s role as an organizer of economic activity. 
In a manner consistent with the philosophy outlined above, the corporate governance 
system defining the limits of managerial discretion of a substantial fraction of the most 
important French corporations, was characterized by the State’s strong influence during 
a significant length of time. In fact, in the past, this influence was exercised on at least at 
four different levels: (i) Industrial politics sometimes led the State to interfere directly 
with certain important firms’ corporate strategies; (ii) Its control over the financial circuit 
was a significant vehicle of influence; (iii) The governance structures of the nationalized 
corporations, which included a certain number of ‘champions’ of the domestic industry, 
depended directly on government decisions; (iv) A significant part of the managerial élite 
owed (and still owe) their education and first professional experience to the public 
administration. At the end of the 1940s, a certain number of reforms translated into legal 
rules according to which the perception was that the State had the privilege of efficiently 
organizing economic activity. This exerted a more or less direct influence on managerial 
discretion in big corporations. In fact, in sectors considered to be strategic, the State 
conducted several nationalizations (e.g. energy), or very closely followed the 
management of firms which had remained in private hands. More generally speaking, the 
State controlled the essential dimensions of the whole financial circuit. Hence, capital 
export and import were limited because of exchange controls. The stock exchange played 
only a minor role in corporate finance. In this context, a famous quotation by de Gaulle 
is quite significant: ‘French politics are not decided at the stock exchange’ (our 
translation). On the contrary, banks and the public treasury and its satellites contributed 
an essential share in financing the economy (Albert, 1991). In this context, the State’s 
privileged position appears even more clearly knowing that the large deposit banks were 
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also nationalized after World War II. The specific governance structures of the 
nationalized firms depended directly on the government’s policy. This concerned notably 
the composition of their boards of directors. It is, however, important to stress that the 
force of the State-controlled governance mechanisms varied with the type of firm under 
study. This force appeared to be most intense in the case of the nationalized firms. But 
even the private sector felt the (more indirect) influence of the State. In fact, beyond its 
control of the financial circuit, the public sector was often a major client. In this way, ‘a 
close symbiosis takes place between the State and the private groups’ (Lesourne, 1998: 
98). Close ties between the State and certain corporations, be they nationalized or private, 
also existed, and still exist, at the level of higher education of the managerial élite. In fact, 
a large proportion of the biggest French firms’ CEOs have received their education at the 
ENA (École Nationale de l’Administration) and/or have started their professional career 
in the public administration. Bertin-Mourot and Bauer (1996: 22) observe that ‘it is in 
France [...] that the transfer of élites from the State’s to the firms’ top positions is greatest’ 
(our translation). In this way, the large corporations partially delegate the ‘detection-
selection-education’ procedure to the State (Bertin-Mourot and Bauer, 1996). It is also 
quite interesting to note that the primary origin of the managerial élite seems to be rather 
constant over time (Bertin-Mourot and Bauer, 1996). To summarize the preceding 
developments, we note that the State traditionally played an important role in the French 
corporate governance system. In what follows, we shall see that the limits imposed on 
managerial discretion by the public administration have been progressively alleviated. 
Even though they are presently weaker than they used to be, they frequently remain 
stronger than in other industrialized countries. For such a comparison, it is possible to 
refer to the example of the market for corporate control, which appears traditionally to be 
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less developed in France than in the Anglo-Saxon sphere. In 1990, Franks and Mayer 
(p.228) still concluded that the public authorities have great discretion in the application 
of the takeover rules. Hence, in certain cases, the French government has allegedly 
retarded the takeover of firms by foreigners in order to find a domestic solution (Franks 
and Mayer 1990). The more recent example of the takeover battle, opposing BNP taking 
over Société Générale and Paribas, equally represents the attempt of interference by the 
public administration. But, at the same time, it perfectly illustrates the weakening of the 
means of public intervention. In fact, the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the 
Central Bank would clearly have preferred a privately negotiated solution to an open 
battle in the market place. In the course of these events, the State’s representatives used 
their right to suspend a revised bid by Société Générale for Paribas, to invite the different 
protagonists to the negotiation table (Le Monde, 1999). During the negotiations, the 
Governor of the Central Bank submitted his own proposals to the conflicting parties. 
Lacking the power to actually impose his project, the unsuccessful end of the negotiations 
implied, however, the obligation to wait for the closure of the official stock-exchange 
procedure in order to obtain a solution. A leading economic newspaper had the following 
comment: ‘This frustrating and unfruitful negotiation demonstrates that the public 
authority lacks the means of actively opposing the fact – in spite of the Finance Minister’s 
publicly expressed wish to the contrary – that the mere “luck of the market” determines 
one of the most important movements in banking France has ever known.’ (Les 
Echos,1999 [our translation]). 
Above, we described the historical roots of the French system of corporate governance, 
which strongly influenced its shape roughly until the middle of the 1980s. Since then, the 
system has undergone some significant transformations, as is illustrated by the BNP-
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Société Générale-Paribas case. In fact, following deregulation, which was initiated by the 
government in 1984, the evolution of French corporate governance has been characterized 
by the diminishing role of the State (Wirtz, 2008b), and the massive inflow of foreign 
equity capital has been a strong driver for further reform. 
 
3. Institutional investors, asset managers and corporate governance reform 
The theory of institutional change (North 1990; 1993) teaches us that institutional change 
is brought about by specific actors qualified as ‘institutional entrepreneurs’. The latter 
promote change with respect to traditional institutional settings. It is assumed that the 
path of institutional change depends on initial conditions. Institutional entrepreneurs thus 
do not act in an institutional vacuum. The following sections show that asset managers 
can be identified, albeit to different degrees, as institutional entrepreneurs for the 
governance of listed companies in Japan and in France. 
 
Japan 
i) Roles of Japanese institutional investors and asset managers in corporate governance 
reform 
Since the latter half of the 1990s in Japan, the Pension Fund Association (PFA), pension 
funds, and asset management firms have created guidelines for the exercise of stockholder 
voting rights, and made forward-looking efforts to the exercise of these rights. American 
institutional investors, exemplified by the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS), are proactively investing in Japanese stocks. Due to influence of this 
sort, Japanese institutional investors have gradually begun to take an interest in corporate 
governance. A questionnaire survey regarding Japanese institutional investors’ influence 
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on corporate governance (Omura, Megumi & Makoto, 2002) 
which was conducted in 2001 by the Ministry of Finance’s (MOF) Policy Research 
Institute showed that asset management firms are highly motivated when it comes to 
exercising stockholder rights at portfolio companies. However, the costs of shareholder 
activism (such as exercising voting rights), and benefits commensurate to these costs, are 
matters of great concern for these asset management firms. Therefore, it has not always 
been the case that asset management firms were proactive with regard to Japanese 
corporate governance reform. On the other hand, the PFA has proactively endorsed 
stockholder activism, including the exercise of voting rights. Due to the stock market 
slump of the 1990s (until the beginning of 2000s), pension funds suffered from sluggish 
yields on assets under management, and the view that weak stock earning rates were 
caused by poor corporate governance gained strength. The PFA clearly defined its stance 
on corporate governance. 
In 1998, the Pension Fund Corporate Governance Research Society released its Action 
Guidelines for the Exercise of Pension Fund Voting Rights. The society put these action 
guidelines together because the suitable exercise of shareholder voting rights – 
fundamental rights possessed by stockholders – was perceived as a first step towards 
giving a concrete form to corporate governance actions for pension funds. These action 
guidelines are important because they stress the necessity of pension funds to fulfil their 
obligation as stockholders to monitor corporate activities based on fiduciary responsibility. 
Moreover, in October 2001, the PFA announced the Practical Guidelines on the Exercise 
of Stockholder Voting Rights (PFA, 2001), which referred to the establishment of systems 
for the exercise of stockholder voting rights by contract organizations, Due to trends of 
this sort, public pension funds such as the Government Pension Investment Fund and 
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Pension Fund Association for Local Government Officials also added items about the 
exercise of stockholder voting rights in their fundamental management policies. 
Directions were also given to asset management companies, asking them to uphold the 
maximization of long-term stockholder value as the ultimate goal of exercising voting 
rights. Corporate governance reform efforts by Japanese asset management firms gained 
strength via initiatives of this type. Today, many large-scale asset management firms are 
creating their own voting right exercise guidelines. 
Afterwards, the PFA was active as an opinion leader in the realm of corporate governance, 
such as establishing return on equity (ROE) target values in 2007. Since the latter half of 
the 2000s, overseas institutional investors, such as Asian Corporate Governance 
Association (ACGA) and voting right exercise advisers, such as Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) have gained greater voice, thereby influencing Japanese corporate 
governance reform. 
 
ii) Exercise of voting rights by Japanese institutional investors 
After PFA determined its practical guidelines in 2001, the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
introduced an independent director system for listed companies in 2010. Also, listed 
companies were required to disclose the results of voting and the remuneration of 
individual officers exceeding 100 million yen. Since ISS’s endorsement of opposition to 
agenda items nominating top management at corporations with no outside directors in 
2013, both issuing firms and institutional investors became more interested in these issues. 
In recent years, institutional investors have paid more attention to agenda items including 
nominating directors, surplus dividends, anti-takeover measures, and responses to 
corporate scandals. Regarding the nomination of officers, the independence of outside 
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directors is an issue. There tend to be more dissenting votes from institutional investors 
regarding outside directors who are from major stockholders, from companies with 
business relationships, relatives, or from a client financial institution, etc. When outside 
directors were being nominated at Olympus after the scandal, the number of votes from 
institutional investors against the nomination of an outside director from a bank was much 
larger than other outside director candidates. Other important governance issues include 
the percentage of attendance at board meetings. Regarding surplus dividends, an 
important point is whether appropriate returns are made to shareholders. Standards for 
the exercise of voting rights also include the capital adequacy ratio, cash ratio, ROE, 
dividend payout ratio, and the acquisition of treasury stock. Ways of thinking regarding 
anti-takeover measures include cases when it is judged that stockholder value will be 
fundamentally damaged, and the need to consider the content of individual anti-takeover 
measures from the viewpoint of improving stockholder value. Regarding responses to 
corporate scandals, many institutional investors oppose agenda items nominating officers; 
and also regarding bonuses and severance payments to officers at corporations, if it is 
believed that damage has been done to corporate value as the result of participating in or 
causing incidents such as violations of laws and ordinances. 
Companies are increasing their visits to asset management firms to explain these points 
for confirmation to institutional investors in a focused way. In some cases, the content of 
agenda items at general meetings is changed via direct dialogue with them before general 
meetings. In addition, as shown by the cases in which shareholder proposals are partially 
accepted and incorporated as company suggestions, in recent years more dialogue is 
taking place between institutional investors and issuing firms. 
According to a voting right exercise survey analysis by the Japan Securities Investment 
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Advisors Association (JSIAA, 2013), most Japanese asset management firms exercise 
their voting rights carefully. Regarding the exercise of voting rights at general meetings, 
the ratio of dissenting or abstaining votes among overall agenda items was around 3% in 
2002. However, this ratio had increased by 2006, and has continually remained above 
10% in recent years. The number of companies that cast dissenting or abstaining votes on 
company-submitted agenda items rose from 7.7% in 2002 to more than 40% in recent 
years. Since 2007, the number of dissenting or abstaining votes has been the largest 
regarding agenda items for nominating directors. It seems that asset management firms 
are casting dissenting or abstaining votes considering the independence of outside 
directors and auditors. 
The Japan Securities and Investment Dealers Association made it an obligation in 
principle for members to disclose the voting guidelines and their voting results in 2010. 
It is thought that institutional investors’ engagement will be conducive to improving 
corporate governance in Japan. 
In February 2014, the Financial Services Agency (FSA) released the Japanese 
stewardship code, which includes seven items: 1) creation and release of fundamental 
policies on asset management; 2) determination of policies regarding conflicts of interest; 
3) proactive participation in portfolio companies; 4) participation in the resolution of 
issues at portfolio companies; 5) determination of policies regarding the exercise of 
voting rights and announcement of results; 6) periodic reports to beneficiaries and 
customers, including results of the exercise of voting rights; 7) periodic dialogue with 
portfolio companies. Among these, the FSA stresses the importance of dialogue with 
portfolio companies – it believes that improvement measures from an external point of 
view can be taken when institutional investors engage in periodic dialogue with 
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corporations. 
 
France 
i) Roles of French institutional investors and asset managers2 in corporate governance 
reform 
In 1997, the Association Française de Gestion Financière (AFG) 3 , a self-regulating 
organization for French asset management companies, established a Corporate 
Governance Committee with the objective of providing guidelines on the exercise of 
voting rights to AFG members. AFG released the Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance (guidelines) in 1998, updated each year ever since (www.afg.asso.fr), 
recommending that members exercise voting rights for the profit of their customers (AFG, 
2012). 
Based on these recommendations, the French Law on Financial Security (LSF) that was 
enacted in 2003 and the general regulations of the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF; 
the French Securities Exchange Commission) 4  include stipulations regarding the 
exercise of voting rights by institutional investors. These stipulate the exercise of voting 
                                                  
2The present study is focused on the (self-perceived) role of asset managers in corporate governance. For 
an account of the influence of the larger population of institutional investors on the adoption of corporate 
governance ‘standards’ by listed companies from the SBF120 stock-index, the interested reader may refer 
to Mizuno (2014). 
3The Association Française de Gestion Financière (AFG) is a French asset management association. Over 
600 French asset management (AM) companies are currently members, and the outstanding assets under 
management total more than 3,600 billion euros. AFG provides expert knowledge from asset management 
specialists to both individual and institutional investors. The AM companies adhere to strict regulations 
regarding approval and control in particular, carrying out business under the supervision of the Autorité des 
Marché’s Financiers (AMF). 
4AMF was established according to the Law on Financial Security of August 2003 (the French equivalent 
to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act). It encourages safe investments in financial products, providing ample 
information that is available to investors, and the sound management of financial markets. It also regulates 
the emissions trading market. The AMF also performs tasks including approval and authorization, 
supervision and monitoring of markets and market participants, punishment for violations of regulations, 
and supervisory activities such as arbitration between individual investors and the providers of investment 
products.  
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rights pertaining to stock possessed by collective investment funds (CIFs) managed by 
asset management firms. If an asset manager does not exercise these rights, an explanation 
is required. In addition, the AMF general regulations require asset management firms to 
release updated investment policies containing conditions on the exercise of voting rights 
pertaining to stocks possessed by managed CIFs. These regulations also require the 
reporting of voting practice by asset management firms. 
The AFG actively promotes the utilization of shareholder voting rights by asset managers, 
and informal dialogue with issuing firms and voting right exercise advisers. Moreover, 
the AFG has shown an extremely proactive attitude towards corporate governance 
reform; for example, it publishes the general meeting resolutions of corporations that are 
not consistent with AFG recommendations. It has had a very strong influence from an 
early stage in France, including the creation of guidelines that are the foundation of 
corporate governance reform by institutional investors. In this way, asset management 
firms have come to play a very important role in corporate governance reform. 
 
ii) Exercise of voting rights by French asset management firms 
In this section, we take a closer look at the actual exercise of voting rights by French asset 
management firms. They have progressively established themselves as a counter-power 
(Pardo & Valli, 2012) and therefore, as a significant actor in the field of corporate 
governance. Pardo and Valli show that this active approach to governance manifests itself 
in asset managers’ voting policy and dialogue with corporate management, and that it has 
steadily increased over time. The role of French asset management firms in the evolution 
of corporate governance hence appears to be time-contingent. 
One means of exerting influence on corporate governance is through exercising voting 
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rights in the general assembly. AFG has conducted regular annual surveys on the exercise 
of voting rights for 12 years. Summary results of the 2013 survey were released in March 
2014 (Pardo & Valli, 2014). They reveal a constant increase in the attendance rate of 
French asset managers at general assemblies (23% increase in the number of meetings 
attended in 2013, after 10% in 2012 and 20% in 2011 [Pardo & Valli, 2014, p. 3]). When 
they attend, they vote in an active manner, which leads to the observation that they cast 
at least one ‘no’ vote at more than 80% of French general assemblies (ibid.). 
 
4. Methodology  
According to institutional change theory (North 1990, 1993), institutions change under 
the influence of institutional entrepreneurs. Above, we have identified asset managers as 
such institutional entrepreneurs promoting a discourse on global standards of corporate 
governance best practice (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). At the same time, 
institutional change is supposed to be path dependent. Hence, it is likely that similar 
discourse becomes institutionalized in different ways in different institutional settings. 
We therefore chose to conduct a comparative survey of the motivations and perceived 
role of asset managers in the process of changing institutions of governance in Japan and 
in France, two countries whose traditional corporate governance system was initially at a 
distance from the ideal type of discourse on global standards. 
 
Japan 
A survey on institutional investors and corporate governance conducted in 2000 by the 
MOF Policy Research Institute (hereafter referred to as ‘MOF Survey’) serves as a 
benchmark to compare the evolution of perception and attitudes over time with respect to 
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our own survey. The MOF survey was conducted amid a steadily increasing awareness of 
corporate governance by institutional investors in Japan. We conducted our questionnaire 
survey on corporate governance by Japanese institutional investors and asset managers. 
This survey emulates many items from the 2000 MOF Survey in order to compare the 
two situations, and was conducted over the period from November 2012 to February 2013. 
We sent out the questionnaire to 634 asset management firms that are members of the 
Japan Investment Advisers Association (JSIAA). Responses were received from 45 
companies. Among the 634 companies, advance contact was received from 31 
institutional investors who said they could not answer for reasons such as not currently 
managing Japanese stock. Bearing this in mind, the response rate was 9.2%. A very large 
number of replies had been received for the earlier MOF Survey, in which 89 of 138 asset 
management firms (65%) responded. The reason for the small response rate of our own 
recent survey was that questionnaires were mailed to all institutional investors affiliated 
with the JSIAA. Not all contacts, however, were relevant for our study. .Among the 
contacted JSIAA members, there were only 79 asset managers who have Japanese stock 
in their portfolio.If we take this number as the relevant denominator, the response rate 
isroughly established at 57%. 
 
France  
An English version of the questionnaire that had served for the Japanese survey was 
translated into French and pre-tested with AFG staff. This pre-test led us to make certain 
modifications of the French questionnaire in order to adapt it to the specific cultural and 
institutional context of France. The French survey examining asset management firms’ 
underlying motivations and behavior in actively influencing corporate governance was 
  
22 
 
conducted in the spring of 2014. The questionnaire was sent to French asset management 
firms, all members of AFG. Responses were received from 24 such firms. This sample 
may seem small when compared with the Japanese sample, but actually represents 
approximately 75% of total assets managed by AFG members, according to AFG staff. It 
can therefore be considered as a highly relevant sample. Asset management firms manage 
financial assets for third parties, such as pension funds and other big investors. The 
objective of this study was to measure the perception by French asset management firms 
of their involvement in corporate governance. 
 
5. Survey results 
Japan 
We found a number of changes in the perception and attitude of Japanese institutional 
investors and asset managers over time, which confirms the increasing institutionalization 
of discourse on corporate governance in their minds. The principal results from our survey 
are as follows: 
• The importance of achieving performance as a duty in fulfilling fiduciary 
responsibility to sponsors has increased compared with 2000. 
• An increasing number of asset management firms disclose an increasing amount 
of information to investors. In addition, the influence of banks and corporations 
on Japanese corporations (keiretsu) is perceived to be decreasing, and the 
influence of investors (stockholders) growing. 
• Asset management firms regard the improvement of corporate governance as an 
effective method of enhancing Japanese corporate management. This includes 
adding the obligation to have outside directors, enhancing the independence and 
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functions of auditors, and improving the functions of boards of directors. 
Furthermore, compared with the MOF Survey, more responses stated that 
stockholder activism by institutional investors is effective; asset managers 
recognize that their own actions are effective for corporate governance reform.  
• Asset management firms feel that dialogue with portfolio companies is an 
effective monitoring activity for actually enhancing corporate value. On the other 
hand, they view oppositional shareholder activism as having few practical effects. 
Asset management firms regard engagement activities, namely dialogue, as 
effective shareholder actions, and believe they are effective for corporate 
governance reform. 
• Major agenda items of concern to asset management firms include management 
policies and strategies, restructuring, officers’ remuneration, number of members 
and composition of boards of directors, information about fund-raising and 
financial affairs, dividend policy, appointment and dismissal of outside directors, 
and allocation of new shares to third parties. Institutional investors that are 
foreign-affiliated companies are greatly interested in officers’ remuneration and 
in particular the composition of the board of directors. 
• Regarding actions taken by asset management firms towards portfolio companies 
with poor performance, responses stateing ‘We have sold off stock’ and ‘We have 
exercised voting rights’ were both 51.1%. In the earlier MOF Survey, the former 
was 79.5% and the latter was 41.3%, showing the growing trend of asset managers 
to utilize the exercise of voting rights (voice) rather than selling off stock (exit). 
In addition, compared with the MOF Survey, there were more responses stating 
‘We have tried to influence decision-making of portfolio companies via individual 
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exchange of opinions’. This indicates that voting rights are being exercised and 
dialogue is held more often. Furthermore, some asset managers are actually taking 
measures such as stockholder lawsuits and dispatching outside directors. This is a 
sign that institutional investors are taking proactive measures in response to 
corporate governance reform. 
• Factors that impede shareholder actions by institutional investors include 
insufficient information and the scheduling of the annual general meeting. To 
ensure more effective action by institutional investors for corporate governance 
reform in future, it will likely be necessary to resolve these issues. Clearing houses 
or other organizations that coordinate opinions from institutional investors could 
help to resolve the issue of insufficient prior information. Utilizing the Corporate 
Reporting Lab that is currently being attempted by the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI) may also be a method for improving communication 
between institutional investors and corporations. 
• Investors often place importance on progressive disclosure and investor relations 
(IR) activities. This indicates that investors want corporations to communicate 
effectively and they expect that corporate value will be improved via engagement 
activities. 
• Many asset management firms evaluate corporate governance initiatives when 
making investments. More than 50% of asset management firms replied that their 
investment activity actually changes when corporate governance is improved via 
measures such as intervention by asset management firms. This indicates that 
asset management firms are considering as investment criteria matters related to 
corporate governance, and view actions – such as dialogue and the exercise of 
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shareholder rights – as methods for improving corporate value. 
 
France 
The principal results from the French survey are as follows: 
• A large majority of asset management firms considers that corporate governance 
has tended to improve over the last five years. Most standard governance 
mechanisms, such as the independence of the audit system, the enhancement of 
the outside director system and the sound functioning of the board of directors, 
are considered to be important criteria for investment decisions. They rate high on 
a five-point scale. In other words, the standard recommendations that can be found 
in most corporate governance codes are not only considered to be important on a 
theoretical basis, but also influence decision making by asset managers. 
• ‘Good’ corporate governance is perceived to have a positive impact on corporate 
value, with an average agreement rate of 4.42 on a five-point scale. Most asset 
management firms do not remain passive when it comes to promoting standard 
governance mechanisms, but consider that their action as investors has a positive 
impact on corporate governance. In that respect, the vast majority of French asset 
management firms (almost two thirds) intend to reinforce their means of 
influencing corporate governance in the future. One of the means of exerting 
influence on corporate governance is through exercising voting rights in the 
general meeting. In order to make up their minds about how to vote on different 
resolutions, our survey finds that all but one French asset management firms 
receive advice from consulting firms. Our survey also shows that the vast majority 
of asset management firms consider that shareholder engagement will still 
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increase in the future.  
• One of the remarkable results of the survey is the relative homogeneity in the 
perception of the importance of standard governance mechanisms for corporate 
value over the long term and, hence, in making investment decisions. However, it 
is also interesting to note that governance mechanisms that feature less 
prominently in the standard literature on governance are also perceived as being 
very important. This is especially the case of both the training system of corporate 
managers influencing managerial skills, and of direct dialogue between asset 
management firms and corporate top management before any formal action (such 
as voting in general meetings). Hence, direct dialogue emerges as a very important 
channel of interaction. There is also one interesting finding which shows that 
shareholder value is not unanimously perceived as being the primary purpose of 
corporate governance (the median scores 3 on a five-point scale, which 
corresponds to the neutral position). This is somewhat surprising since the survey 
targets are asset management firms. It could be due to a specific French cultural 
bias favoring a more stakeholder-oriented approach to governance. 
• In a nutshell, our survey confirms that corporate governance is perceived by 
French asset management firms as an important determinant of corporate value, 
although shareholder value is not specifically considered as the primary purpose 
of governance. Asset management firms declare that they actively and 
increasingly influence governance, especially through direct dialogue with 
corporate management, and that ‘good’ governance has a bearing on their 
investment decisions 
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Comparing Japan and France 
The preceding developments clearly indicate that corporate governance has undergone 
significant reform both in France and in Japan over the last 15 years, albeit at a different 
pace. In fact, the pace of change appears to be much slower in Japan, where major 
institutional reforms are quite recent. In both countries, we show that institutional 
investors and asset managers have taken an active part in the discussion surrounding 
reform and they exert direct influence on corporate governance by actively exercising 
their voting rights at general shareholder meetings at increasing rates. Our questionnaire 
surveys of French and Japanese asset managers show that the latter increasingly integrate 
the standard discourse about corporate governance best practice into the perception of 
their own role as advocates of such standard governance prescriptions as director 
independence, accountability to shareholders, etc. Since each country has its own specific 
institutional history, the increasing institutionalization of a certain discourse on global 
standards of corporate governance, as exemplified by the OECD principles, does not 
mean, however, that the adoption of this discourse necessarily leads to homogeneous 
governance systems. In fact, it cannot be excluded that, depending on the specific initial 
institutional context, standard governance mechanisms are appropriated and translated 
into actual practice in very different ways, hence the interest of a comparison of the 
Japanese and French surveys. Since both countries feature corporate governance systems 
that are historically at a distance from the Anglo-Saxon benchmark, and both also 
experience an active role of asset managers in corporate governance reform, it is 
interesting to observe to what extent discourse on governance best practice leads to 
similar or different results. 
As Figure 1 shows, most asset management firms in France consider that corporate 
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governance has tended to improve over time. Most of their Japanese counterparts do not 
perceive such an improvement. The proportion of positive answers by Japanese asset 
management firms is only 40% compared with the French, which is more than 80%. This 
may be related to the relatively more recent nature of Japanese reforms. In Japan, the 
stewardship code was introduced only recently, in February 2014, and the bill related to 
corporate governance reform was passed at long last in July 2014. It is not unlikely that 
there will be an increase in the perceived quality of corporate governance (relative to 
standard discourse) in the not too distant future.  
As shown in Figure 2, transparency of information, independence and functional 
enhancement of the audit system, enhancement of the outside director system and 
improvement of the functioning of the board of directors are considered as important 
elements for both countries’ asset management firms. This is very much in line with 
standard discourse on corporate governance best practice, which can thus be said to be 
endorsed by asset managers in both countries, with the notable exception of the 
separation of chairman of the board and CEO, which is perceived as being of relatively 
little importance in both countries. This is actually a slight deviance from standard 
discourse. Other governance mechanisms, such as the education and skills of corporate 
managers, are considered differently by the two countries. Education and skills are 
considered to be more important in France, for example, than in Japan. 
Figure 3 shows that almost all asset management firms in France, as against an only slight 
majority in Japan, think that they have a positive impact on corporate governance 
(Strongly agree + Tend to agree: 96% in France; 51% in Japan). Hence, it can be said that 
French asset managers presently perceive their role for corporate governance and the 
evolution of its practice to be more important than their Japanese counterparts. 
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Figure 4 indicates that French asset management firms engage in a dialogue with the 
investee company relatively more often than Japanese asset management firms. With the 
recent introduction of the Japanese stewardship code, the Japanese government 
recommends that institutional investors, asset management firms and asset owners should 
dialogue more with the investee company. A future increase of dialogue can therefore be 
expected in Japan.  
Figure 5 reveals one interesting finding indicating that shareholder value (Jensen, 2001) 
is not unanimously perceived as being the primary purpose of corporate governance in 
France (46% approval rate). The corresponding result is different for Japan, where 60 % 
of respondent asset management firms think that maximization of shareholder value is 
the primary purpose of corporate governance. There used to be a specific Japanese 
cultural bias favoring a more stakeholder-oriented approach to corporate governance. 
However, our findings show that the maximization of shareholder value is becoming a 
widespread principle in Japan, at least in the discourse of professional asset managers. 
Figure 6 shows that asset management firms in both countries think that shareholder 
engagement will increase in the future. However, this trend is perceived to be stronger in 
France. Asset management firms in both countries think that meeting with the company 
is the most effective way to improve corporate value. 
As Figure 7 shows, in both countries, a lack of preliminary information is perceived as a 
significant problem when asset management firms wish to exercise their voting rights.  
However, other blocking points are different. For example, blocking of the shares, cost 
for shareholder voting and power of attorney are perceived as the biggest problem in 
France. (However, this mainly concerns foreign firms in the portfolio of French asset 
managers.) The cost of shareholder voting seems to be a lesser problem for Japanese asset 
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management firms.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Although our Japanese-French survey features a limited number of respondents, it is, to 
our knowledge, the first of its kind with a systematic comparative stance, and gives us 
valuable insight into the self-perceived role of the most significant professional asset 
managers in both countries as important actors of contemporaneous corporate governance. 
On the evolutionary path of different national corporate governance systems, our survey 
shows that asset managers endorse a certain discourse on what is perceived as global 
standards of ‘good’ governance (director independence, accountability to shareholders, 
etc.) and feel that they actively contribute to the institutionalization of such discourse, 
although the strength and pace of their contribution is perceived differently in France and 
in Japan. Hence, referring to the theory of institutional change (North 1990, 1993), we 
have strong reasons to believe that asset managers intentionally act as institutional 
entrepreneurs in Japan and in France, although the French perceive a stronger capacity to 
do so than the Japanese. 
More specifically, we found that the institutions and practice of corporate governance in 
the case of listed companies have changed over recent years in both France and Japan. 
Institutional investors and asset management firms have become important players in the 
evolution of corporate governance in both countries.They perceive themselves as active 
players in this process and exert influence, especially through voting in general meetings 
and, more importantly still, direct dialogue with portfolio companies. The perceived 
importance of direct dialogue as the most effective means of influencing the practice of 
corporate governance is an important finding of our study. It shows that the spread of a 
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certain discourse of corporate governance best practice does not lead to a complete 
convergence of national corporate governance systems toward a unique standard, for 
achieving change through direct dialogue is at odds with the more confrontational 
approach to shareholder activism which characterizes the Anglo-Saxon-style of corporate 
governance. In this respect, the emphasis of respondents to our survey on the importance 
and effectiveness of direct dialogue versus confrontational activism confirms an in-depth 
case analysis concerning Japanese shareholder activism recently realized by Buchanan, 
Chai & Deakin (2014). 
Furthermore, comparative historical accounts show that the pace of reform has been much 
faster in France over the past decade than in Japan. In both countries, transparency of 
information, independence of outside directors and improvement of the functioning of the 
board of directors are perceived as important dimensions in reforming corporate 
governance. Hence, discourse on standard mechanisms of governance is equally endorsed 
by asset managers in Japan and in France. However, Japanese asset managers feel a 
weaker ability to actually enforce this discourse than their French counterparts. 
One original finding of our study is that shareholder value, a central feature of standard 
global discourse, is not unanimously perceived as being the primary purpose of corporate 
governance in France. This corroborates the existence of institutional path dependence 
according to institutional theory for it shows that the scope of adopting standard global 
discourse may not be homogeneous over institutional settings. Intriguingly, the 
maximization of shareholder value seems to have become more widely accepted in Japan, 
at least in the discourse of asset managers in our sample. The latter result for Japan must, 
however, be interpreted with caution, since it cannot be excluded that this result is driven 
by our specific sample.  
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Our finding is surprising because, in Japan, there is a historical tendency to understand 
corporations as ‘communities’ made up of managers and full time employees. Team 
members have fixed relationships due to a system of lifetime employment, and therefore 
the relationship between members becomes a repeated game, in turn stimulating 
cooperation between members. This is the reason why Japan is traditionally qualified as 
a pluralistic stakeholder oriented country (Yoshimori, 1995). Our survey indicates that 
change is going on in Japan as far as the commonly-accepted corporate objective function 
is concerned. Foreign investors who have recently increased their stock holding tend to 
spread the shareholder value norm in Japan.  
Overall, the results of our comparative survey are in line with the rationale of institutional 
change theory (North 1990, 1993). Institutional change is driven by so-called institutional 
entrepreneurs, asset managers in our case. At the same time, institutional change is path 
dependent, and its specific trajectory depends on the initial institutional setting. This may 
explain the perceived variable strength of impact of asset managers in France and Japan 
on achieving effective change. The adoption of standard discourse on governance best 
practice is not homogeneous across national settings.This has practical implications for 
asset managers investing in different national settings who want to play an active role in 
corporate governance. They need to adapt their discourse and choose the appropriate 
channel to communicate their discourse. In the case of France and Japan, direct dialogue 
with corporate management (versus confrontational activism) appears to be the most 
effective communication channel in promoting corporate governance reform. 
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Figure 1 
Would you say that during the last five years corporate governance has tended to 
improve? 
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Figure 2 
What are the key items in relation to the improvement of corporate governance? 
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Figure 3 
Do you agree with the following statement? ‘Our Action (Voting in the General Meeting 
dialogue…) as an investor has a positive impact on corporate governance’? 
 
Figure 4 
Do you engage in direct dialogue with the investee company? 
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Figure 5 
Is the purpose of the corporate governance maximization of the shareholder value? 
 
Figure 6 
Will the shareholder engagement increase? 
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Figure 7 
What are the stumbling blocks in exercising voting rights? 
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